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Abstract
I study an economy with sellers and buyers with unit supplies and unit demands. Both
parties have valuations uniformly distributed on a unit interval. I quantify the inefficiency,
compared to the Walrasian market, caused by a market where the agents meet randomly.
There are several causes of inefficiency that I deal with separately. First, even if there is
perfect information about valuations it makes a difference whether all agents participate in
the markets or whether only those who would trade in the Walrasian market participate.
The same applies when there is private information about valuations.
JEL Classification: C78, D40, D50, D60, D80
Keywords: Imperfect information, markets structure, random matching.
Klaus Kultti
Department of Economics
University of Helsinki
P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7)
FI-00014 University of Helsinki
FINLAND
e-mail: klaus.kultti@helsinki.fi
1 Introduction
The purpose of this article is to quantify the e¢ciency loss associated with
imperfect or non-Walrasian markets. Economies where the agents meet ran-
domly constitute one of the best behaved classes of non-Walrasian models. A
particularly applicable model of random matching is the urn-ball model where,
say, buyers contact randomly sellers; when there is a continuum of buyers and
sellers a seller may meet any number of buyers, and the number is given by a
Poisson-distribution. This environment allows for an interesting price forma-
tion mechanism: When there are several buyers who want what the seller has a
natural way to resolve the allocation problem is by auction. In a meeting where
there is only one buyer and asymmetric information about the value of the ob-
ject between the buyer and the seller there is no trading mechanism that results
in an e¢cient outcome (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). For simplicity, I
assume that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
Auction is the archetypical competitive price formation mechanism and I
am interested only in market imperfections that are not too di¤erent from the
Walrasian markets; it is very easy to come up with markets and price mech-
anisms that are so di¤erent from the Walrasian ones that they have nothing
interesting in common. For instance, the standard search theoretic markets
with pairwise meetings with Nash-bargaining is of no great interest (for another
example see Gale and Sabourian, 2005). Further, it is not applicable in situ-
ations with uncertainty about the valuations of the parties. Non-cooperative
bargaining protocols under uncertainty feature a multitude of equilibria and are
technically unnecessarily di¢cult for my purposes.
This set-up allows me to quantify, i.e., to calculate, the exact percentages
as to the ine¢ciency that is just due to giving up the Walrasian framework
but retaining perfect information. This is accomplished by assuming that all
the buyers are homogeneous and that all the sellers are homogeneous. Then I
introduce heterogeneity in the valuations and study two cases. In one case only
the buyers and sellers who would trade in the Walrasian markets participate in
the markets where the agents are randomly matched. In the other case all agents
participate in the market. To do this I cannot work with general distributions
of valuations. Not too surprisingly I use the uniform distribution; it is amenable
to calculations. But it is also the distribution with maximum entropy, and my
conjecture is that it results in maximum ine¢ciency, too. This I do not, however,
attempt to prove.
2 The model
Assume that there is a unit interval of both buyers and sellers. Their valuations
are uniformly distributed between zero and unity. The economy lasts only for
one period, meaning that the agents have only one chance to trade. This sim-
pli…es things greatly since in a dynamic economy I should calculate the agents’
expected future utilities. Then the agents’reservation values should be deter-
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mined in equilibrium and this is very hard. I think that limiting the study to
the static case is not a serious drawback since it can still be shown that the
higher a seller’s valuation the higher his expected utility in both the dynamic
and static model. And the same applies to the buyers, too.
The buyers contact sellers randomly in a symmetric fashion, and the number
of buyers a seller meets is given by the Poisson distribution with rate 1 =
#bu yers
#sellers
. Thus, the probability that a seller meets exactly k buyers is e¡1 1
k!
.
Before going to calculations let me note that in the Walrasian equilibrium
the price would be one half, and the maximum number of trades would be com-
pleted. In the decentralised market there are sellers who do not meet any buyers.
Further, not all meetings result in a trade as either the buyers’valuations are
not as high as the sellers’valuations, or the buyers strategically o¤er less than
their own valuation trading o¤ the high probability of trade for high gains from
trade. Also trades that would not take place in the Walrasian market happen:
Consider, for instance, a buyer with a low valuation (less than one half) who
meets a seller alone. With positive probability the seller is a low valuation type
who accepts the buyer’s o¤er.
Auction is straightforward but I have to determine a buyer’s optimal take-
it-or-leave-it o¤er when he meets a seller alone and the valuations are private
information. Consider a buyer with valuation v. Denote his o¤er by b. It
maximises his expected utility
(v ¡ b)F (b) (1)
where F is the distribution function of the sellers’valuations. With a uniform
distribution the …rst order condition yields the optimal o¤er
b =
v
2
(2)
Note that the meeting probabilities, i.e., the ratio of buyers to sellers remains
the same in both cases.
2.1 All buyers and sellers in the market or the large mar-
ket
2.1.1 Private information about valuations
Assume then that a seller with valuation w meets k buyers. Now the buyers
engage in an auction where the winner is the buyer with the highest valuation
and he pays the second highest valuation. But there is a twist since the second
highest valuation can be less than half of the highest valuation. Then the
winning buyer raises his bid until it is in accordance with (2). This means that
if a buyer’s valuation is not at least twice the seller’s valuation or if the second
highest valuation of the buyers is not above the seller’s valuation trade does not
take place.
I need the joint density function for the highest and second highest order
statistics. Remember that the valuations are assumed uniform with density
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f(x) = 1 on [0; 1]. Assume that a seller meets k ¸ 2 buyers. Denote the highest
valuation by v1 and the second highest by v2.1 It is given by
g(v1; v2) = k(k ¡ 1)f(v1)f(v2)Fk¡2(v2) = k(k ¡ 1)vk¡22 (3)
where the second equality follows from the assumption about uniform distribu-
tion.
When k ¸ 2 there are three di¤erent cases to consider. First, the seller may
have any valuation w between zero and one half and the highest valuation of
the buyers is larger than twice the seller’s valuation. Then the expected gains
are given by Z 1=2
0
Z 1
2w
kvk¡11 (v1 ¡ w)dv1dw = ¡
1
8
+
2k + 1
4 (k + 2)
(4)
Second, the seller may have any valuation w between zero and one half and
the highest valuation of the buyers is less than twice the seller’s valuation and
the second highest valuation is larger than the seller’s valuation. Then the
expected gains are given byZ 1=2
0
Z 2w
w
Z 2w
v2
k(k ¡ 1)vk¡22 (v1 ¡ w)dv1dv2dw
=
k ¡ 1
4 (k + 1) (k + 2)
¡ k ¡ 1
k + 1
1
2k+3
(5)
Third, the seller may have any valuation w between one half and unity. Then
trade takes place only if the second highest valuation is higher than the seller’s
valuation. The expected gains are given byZ 1
1=2
Z 1
w
Z 1
v2
k(k ¡ 1)vk¡22 (v1 ¡ w)dv1dv2dw
=
2k + 1
2 (k + 1)
+
1
k + 1
1
2k+1
¡ 7
8
+
k ¡ 1
k + 1
1
2k+3
(6)
Summing (4), (5) and (6) I get the expected gains in a k-buyer meeting
k ¡ 1
2(k + 1)
+
1
k + 1
1
2k+1
(7)
If a seller meet exactly one buyer trade only takes place if the buyer’s val-
uation is at least twice the seller’s valuation. The expected gains are given
by Z 1=2
0
Z 1
2w
kvk¡11 (v1 ¡ w)dv1dw =
1
8
(8)
1These should be indexed by k, too, but I omit this as there should not arise any confusion.
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2.1.2 Perfect information about valuations
When a seller with valuation w meets k buyers there is trade if the highest
valuation of the buyers is greater than w. The density of the highest valuation
v1 is given by h(v1) = kf(v1)Fk¡1(v1) = kvk¡11 . Thus, the expected gains from
trade in a k-buyer meeting areZ 1
0
Z 1
w
kvk¡11 (v1 ¡ w) dv1dw =
1
2
¡ 1
k + 1
+
1
(k + 1) (k + 2)
(9)
2.2 Agents with certain gains from trade in the market or
the small market
2.2.1 Private information about valuations
Let me now assume that only the agents who ’should’be in the market are
there. Namely, all the buyers whose valuation are above one half and all the
sellers whose valuation is less than one half. Given that there are k buyers the
density function, i.e., the probability that any buyer’s valuation is x is given by
d(x) = 2 and the distribution function by D(x) = 2x ¡ 1. In the same vein the
density of the highest valuation is given by
h(v1) = kf(v1)F
k¡1(v1) = 2k (2v1 ¡ 1)k¡1
Given that the number of buyers is k ¸ 2 there are two cases to consider.
First, when the seller’s valuation w is less than one fourth. Then the buyers’
valuations are necessarily at least twice as high and trade always takes place.
If the seller’s valuation w is between one fourth and one half trade again takes
place if the buyers’highest valuation is at least double the seller’s valuation.
The expected gains areZ 1=4
0
Z 1
1=2
2k (2v1 ¡ 1)k¡1 (v1 ¡ w) dv1dw +Z 1=2
1=4
Z 1
2w
2k (2v1 ¡ 1)k¡1 (v1 ¡ w) dv1dw
=
3
¡
2k2 + 4k + 1
¢
16 (k + 1) (k + 2)
(10)
Second, if the seller’s valuation w is between one fourth and one half trade
takes place even if the highest valuation is below double the seller’s valuation
since the second highest valuation is necessarily above the seller’s valuation.
The expected gains areZ 1=2
1=4
Z 2w
1=2
2k (2v1 ¡ 1)k¡1 (v1 ¡ w) dv1dw = 2k + 1
16 (k + 1) (k + 2)
(11)
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Expressions (11) and (12) sum to
3k + 1
8(k + 1)
=
3
8
¡ 1
4(k + 1)
(12)
When there is only one buyer and the seller’s valuation is less than one fourth
trade takes place for certain. If the seller’s valuation is between one fourth and
one half trade takes place only if the buyer’s valuation is at least double the
seller’s valuation. The expected gains areZ 1=4
0
Z 1
1=2
2 (v1 ¡ w) dv1dw +
Z 1=2
1=4
Z 1
2w
2 (v1 ¡ w) dv1dw = 7
32
(13)
2.2.2 Perfect information about valuations
All buyers’valuations are higher than all sellers’valuations and consequently
the agents always trade. The expected gains from trade in a k-buyer meeting
are given byZ 1=2
0
Z 1
1=2
2k (2v1 ¡ 1)k¡1 (v1 ¡ w) dv1dw = 3
8
¡ 1
4 (k + 1)
(14)
3 Analysis
In the previous section the expected gains were calculated given that k buyers
come to a seller with valuation w, and then I calculated the expectation of
these gains over all possible values of w, i.e., I integrated over w. To get the
…nal results it is necessary to sum over k, too, and this is what is done next.
But before that let me remind of the case with homogeneous buyers and sellers.
In this case it does not matter whether valuations are private information or not
since all the buyers have the same valuation and all the sellers have the same
valuation. Trade takes place whenever a seller meets at least one buyer and this
happens with probability 1 ¡ e¡1 ¼ 0:632.
The expected gains in the large market can now be calculated to be with
private information
e¡1
1
8
+ e¡1
1X
k=2
1
k!
1
k + 1
1
2k+1
+ e¡1
1X
k=2
1
k!
k ¡ 1
2 (k + 1)
= e¡1=2 ¡ 1
2
¼ 0:107 (15)
and with perfect information
e¡1
1X
k=1
1
k!
µ
1
2
¡ 1
k + 1
+
1
(k + 1) (k + 2)
¶
=
1
2
¡ e¡1 ¼ 0:132 (16)
The expected gains in the small market with private information are given
by
e¡1
7
32
+ e¡1
1X
k=2
1
k!
3
8
¡ e¡1
1X
k=2
1
k!
1
4(k + 1)
=
3
32
e¡1 +
1
8
¼ 0:159 (17)
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and with perfect information
e¡1
1X
k=1
1
k!
µ
3
8
¡ 1
4 (k + 1)
¶
¼ 0:171 (18)
Now I am in a position to compare the e¢ciency of the two market structures
and the two information structures. In the Walrasian markets all the possible
trades are executed at price one half. The price is just a transfer that does not
a¤ect the total gains which add up to 0:375. To quantify the ine¢ciency caused
by heterogeneity and not by private information the appropriate comparison is
to the small market with perfect information. There 0:171=0:375 = 45:6% of
the possible gains are realised. When the valuations are private information the
realised gains are 0:159=0:375 = 42:4%. In this case the di¤erence is quite small.
In the large market under perfect information 0:132=0:375 = 35:2% of the
possible gains are realised. When valuations are private information 0:107=0:375 =
28:5% of the gains are realised.
Proposition 1 Both under perfect information and private information the
small market is more e¢cient than the large market Under perfect informa-
tion the small market yields 45:6% of the gains of the Walrasian market and the
large market yields 35:2% of the gains of the Walrasian market . Under private
information the corresponding gains are 42:4% in the small market, and 28:5%
in the large market.
Notice that the drop in e¢ciency in far more dramatic in the large market
than in the small market when comparing perfect information and private infor-
mation cases. This is because private information leads to strategic behaviour,
i.e., solitary buyers o¤ering just half of their valuation, but in the large market
this leads to no trade more often than in the small market where it is known
that each buyer values the goods more than any seller.
4 Conclusion
I study a parameterised situation of decentralised markets where the di¢culty of
co-ordinating the agents contacts keeps the economy from realising all potential
gains. On top of that I introduce heterogeneity into the agents’valuations.
Depending on which agents participate in the market there may be signi…cant
di¤erences in e¢ciency.To my knowledge these e¢ciency losses have not been
spelled out before, and they may be instructive even though the results are
based on uniform distribution of valuations and there being equal numbers of
buyers and sellers.
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